In as far as the regulation of abortion deals with issues like how and to what extent can women's capacity to gestate and give birth be controlled, and by whom, any discourse on abortion necessarily reflects a construction of women's citizenship, hence of gender. The question is, which is the ruling construction? Behind meta-legal discourses that focus on human life and public power's duty to protect it there lies the modern construction of gender that articulates women's passive citizenship within the State. This is also true of confrontational discourses that construct women and the foetus as potential adversaries. Both discourses are traditional in continental Europe. Yet they are being superseded by an understanding of abortion from the perspective of women's active citizenship. Spanish Organic Act 2/2010 stands as part of this trend. Not surprisingly, governmental attempts to reinstate women's passive citizenship in this matter have met stark resistance.
legal obligation to protect (innocent iv ) human life are uncompromising, in particular arguments that defend that all (innocent) human life deserves equal protection. They differ on the point at which human life begins. At one end are those who argue that human life begins at birth (Singer, 1993; Tooley, 2009) ; at the other are those who argue that it begins with conception -or with nidation (Finnis, 1991; Wolf-Devine & Devine, 2009 ). Some of the latter argue that abortion amounts to murder, based on all human life's equal worth, whilst others concede that foetuses deserve less protection than (born) legal persons, thus allowing for some analytical flexibility to ponder the relative weight of the protection due to the foetus and the pregnant woman 's rights. v This is the traditional approach in continental Europe.
A second problem with meta-legal arguments is that they rest on the modern "sex-gender system" (Rubin, 1975: 159) . They take for granted the dichotomous gendered citizenship model that sustains modern States. Here male (active) citizenship was defined by the ideals of independence, rationality, individuality and participation in the public spheres of politics and work and was regarded as the normative model (Marshall, 1963) . Every expression of dependency, irrationality, emotions, relations or care was displaced towards female (passive) citizenship by means of a (hetero)sexual fraternal contract (Landes, 1988: 158; Pateman, 1988; Wittig, 1992) . Regarded as the anomaly, passive citizenship infantilised and subjected women to the rule of men and/or a male State through the "care/control paradigm" (Joseph, 2003: 159) , hence to the heteronomy of norms designed by and for others. This modern sex-gender system is at the core of non-negotiable meta-legal discourses on abortion that rely on the worth on unborn life and women's natural destiny to care for it, that articulate the State's duty to protect the former and enforce the latter even against women's (unnatural, irresponsible, misguided) resistance. It also informs discourses that defend women's right or freedom to abort as a result of balancing it against the protection foetuses deserve.
These discourses are drafted, moreover, in confrontational terms. They construct the foetus and the pregnant woman as isolated, self-sufficient beings whose relationship poses potential dangers to the individuality of both, and then see rights as 
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instruments to solve conflicts between the two. As Carol Gilligan (1982) spelled out, such confrontational approaches are typically male. They are also profoundly counterfactual. Real people are not isolated and self-sufficient, but entrenched in complex relational networks (Minow, 1990; Eisler 2012: 1-29) , all of whichvoluntary and involuntary, structural and accessory, inevitable and fortuitouscontribute to shaping our identity in diverse and often contradictory ways. Rather than being in opposition to their relationships, individuals and relationships reciprocally define each other. In this light, individual identities become dynamic, the result of a constant creative process of (re)invention (Nedelsky, 2012: 158-159) ; they become, in a performative logic (Butler 1990) , the combination of their relational roles, "the personality they present themselves as" (Luhmann, 1965: 69-70 ). This is not to deny individuals' autonomy. It is to acknowledge that autonomy is shaped, not in isolation and against our relational networks, but from within and through them, though also against specific relationships. Indeed, every relationship offers a different perspective on ourselves, thus providing a critical standpoint to assess others and their roles in shaping our self-knowledge. Thus regarded, autonomy becomes our capacity to adopt "reflexive role-distance" with respect to any relationship (Benhabib, 1992: 73) , to contemplate ourselves critically from the perspective of one/some of our relationships, to turn our critical observations into action and to alternate our standpoint, so that any relationship can be the object of scrutiny from the perspective of any other. This makes autonomy relational and dynamic (Meyers, 2004; Nedelsky, 2012) , the result of an on-going dialogue among the relationships to which we are part.
Women's real-life abortion decisions are profoundly relational. They are not based on calculations as to whose entitlements are stronger, theirs or those of the foetus. They rather turn around the pregnant woman's relational context, around the question of whether or not a (new) mother-child relationship could be integrated in it and at what cost to existing relationships (Gilligan, 1982: 70-105 
The German Influence
In 1975, the German Federal Constitutional Court decided on the constitutionality of a Criminal Code amendment passed in 1974. The amendment decriminalised abortions performed during the first twelve gestation weeks, subject to the requirement that the pregnant woman went through medical and social counselling aimed at explaining the means and services the welfare State placed at her disposal.
The amendment also decriminalised abortion in cases of malformations in the foetus during the first twenty-two gestation weeks (eugenic abortion) and at any stage during pregnancy if the pregnant woman's life or health were at risk (therapeutic abortion). The German Court ruled exceptions based on foetal abnormality and on risk to the life/health of the woman as constitutional and pointed at two possible further ones: ethical and social abortion, in cases of rape and exceptional social difficulties, respectively. Yet it declared the decriminalisation of abortions within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy unconstitutional because it did not sufficiently protect the unborn (BVerfGE 39, 1, 25 February 1975 
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Gender thus colluded with a meta-legal discourse to frame a constitutional discourse on abortion centred on the foetus, not the pregnant woman. The decision was couched, furthermore, in a male-style confrontational logic that constructs pregnant women and unborn life as potential enemies in a zero-sum game, thus further removing the legal discourse on abortion from women's reality. It is with this decision in mind that Spain passed its first democratic law on abortion.
Spanish Legal Framework prior to 2010
Until 1985 consideration. Yet the Court was somewhat ambiguous on this point and at times appeared to regard the exceptions as constitutional demands (see especially FJ 11). In any case, the question was not whether the State may waive all protection of the unborn in these instances, but whether it may "protect fundamental rights using techniques that exclude criminal punishment" (FJ 9). Note that the Court was not asked to examine other forms of protection, hence at times assumed that without criminal law the foetus remained unprotected. Still, the Court said, there are singular or exceptional cases where "(r)esorting to the maximum constriction -criminal penalty-in order to impose in these exceptional cases the conduct that is required in normal cases would be inappropriate" (ibid.). specific right of pregnant women, the Court argued that it would be unreasonable to impose upon families and parents, particularly mothers, a burden that exceeds what is normally required of them, particularly (and this is the interesting part) given "the lack of State and social provisions which would contribute significantly to mitigating" that burden and "to removing the insecurity" it provokes (FJ 11).
This passage could be read as a warning that those who knowingly decide to
give birth to a disabled child do so at their own risk and costs. Yet it could also be read as introducing a preventative approach to abortion, as it indirectly connects eugenic abortion to the deficiencies of the welfare State. Indeed, instead of connecting the notion of "unreasonable demands" with women's nature and the moral duties derived thereof, as the German Constitutional Court had done, it linked it to the insufficiency of State provisions to assist parents, most particularly mothers.
The implication could be that the more the State provides support for parents of children with disabilities, the more difficult it becomes to justify eugenic abortion.
Yet this also brings forth the relational dimension of responsibilities emanating from pregnancy and birth, as well as the State's duty to attend to this relational dimension as part of its commitment towards human life. The Court thus seems to be opening the door to the possibility of channelling these duties, not through criminal law, but through social provisions that help to shape the relational framework within which abortion is decided. It seems to be opening the door to an approach to abortion that is not punitive but preventative, that is not transcendental and confrontational but selfreferential, that takes women's active citizenship seriously and that embraces abortion in its socio-relational dimension. This approach soon started to gain ground in continental Europe. Again, the German Constitutional Court played a central role in its articulation.
III. A new European approach: the socio-relational dimension of abortion
On 27 June 1992, reunified Germany passed a new federal Act on abortion with a view to harmonising existing legislation in former West and East Germany. This Act introduced a time-frame system that decriminalised abortions practiced during the first twelve gestation weeks, provided the pregnant woman had gone through a Pregnancy, the Court now added, unites two lives in one (it entails a "duality in regards pregnant women who consider abortion as either selfish and irresponsible, or too weak or ignorant to know their own good (par. 11.6). It compelled us to regard them as valid interlocutors, as active citizens who face a decision that has long-term life implications and that must be taken "from within a network of interlocking, concurring and often irreconcilable responsibilities and obligations" (par. 11.4.10 -my translation; the paragraph includes references to Dworkin, 1993: 58, and Gilligan, 1982: 58-60) . It compelled us to regard the decision to abort, not as a symptom of irresponsibility, but a sign that women take family responsibilities very seriously (Jaggar, 2009: 170) . A preventative approach, concluded this Court, can influence the decision of at least those women who are as yet undecided -in practical terms, it noted, the only women that matter (par. 11.4.10).
The 
IV, The socio-relational dimension of abortion in Spanish Organic Act 2/2010
The application of abortion law in Spain after STC 53/1985 created great insecurity amongst women and doctors. Therapeutic abortion, which could be performed at any time during pregnancy, was interpreted in wide and flexible terms to allow for the protection of pregnant women's mental or psychological health. health system, however, the RHUP works on a regional basis, as does the decision to authorise a health centre to practice abortions. The result is that the number of publicly funded abortions varied greatly depending on the Autonomous Community. Despite such measures, reality continues to make it hard for mothers to build a professional life. xvii Abortion rates reflect this reality.
Organic Act 2/2010, 3 March, changed Spanish abortion legislation and adopted a double preventative strategy. xviii Its aim is first and foremost to prevent unwanted pregnancies through sexual education. In the case of pregnancy, there is a statutory right to abort during the first fourteen gestation weeks, provided abortion is preceded by a counselling process, followed by at least three days' reflection period There remain, however, some causes for caution. While women must be informed of their rights and benefits in a standardised and confidential manner, 4 and 10) . Moreover, this information is not required to be neutral, as it was in the original Draft Bill; to be sure, it is not explicitly aimed at preventing abortion (Section 17.5 explicitly requires it to be objective), yet preventing abortion is undoubtedly its ultimate purpose. After all, the counselling process is key to satisfying the State's constitutional duty to protect unborn human life. This arouses concern that counselling can become a channel for meta-legal considerations on women's natural duties, as well as for assumptions about women's incapacity to make their own life decisions responsibly without State's input, hence about women's passive citizenship, and for the care/control paradigm xx . This is the more so the less responsible, the less autonomous and the more vulnerable women appear to be in the public imagination, which could open the door to covert discrimination of women belonging to some social groups. Much depends on how seriously doctors take both women's active citizenship and the relational dimension of pregnancy and abortion. It also depends on how seriously the State takes its duty to create socio-economic conditions that make abortion a less frequent option -something Spain's current economic recession and political own moral weakness. xxvii The same applies to confrontational discourses that oppose the interests of the foetus and the pregnant woman and that are both counterfactual in their assumptions and male-biased in their analytical tools. It is both counterfactual and male-biased to isolate the pregnant woman and the foetus as separate individuals and confront them as potential enemies, instead of embracing their essential interconnection and the need to protect the one through the other. It is also counterfactual and male-biased to look at pregnancy in isolation from its social, economic and legal contexts, to ignore how a woman's position in these contexts conditions her relationship to the foetus and her future motherhood. The result is a distorted view of abortion that misses its social and gendered reality (Gilligan, 1982; García Pascual, 2006) , and that makes a dialogue between the law and that reality impossible, thus placing women in a position of helpless heteronomy (Jaggar, 2009: 164 ).
The alternative is a self-referential regulation of abortion that rests on the tenets of democratic citizenship and that contemplates abortion from a relational perspective that does not antagonise unborn life and women's autonomy. A relational approach to abortion consistent with both women's active citizenship and the State's constitutional obligations towards the unborn would make the decision to abort rely entirely on women before the foetus is viable. After that, pregnant women would be allowed to give birth prematurely, so that the State can take direct care of the foetus.
A relational approach to abortion must be, moreover, a relational approach to pregnancy and parenthood. In order for their choice to be truly autonomous, women must have enough meaningful options available to them (Raz, 1986: 373 At the other side of the spectrum were Castilla-León with 3, Aragón, Extremadura, Castilla-La Mancha with 2 and La Rioja with 1. Until 2012 Navarra had no health centre authorised to perform abortions in Navarra. Navarra's health services referred women to authorised health centres in nearby Communities and covered medical and travel expenses as part of a policy to keep Navarra an "abortion-free" region. Navarra now has one private authorised health centre. 
